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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~OLIZ and
VIDA LI~~ ~OLIZ, by Eddie Soliz,
lll'r Ouardian ad Litem,
Plaintiffs alld Respondents,

El HHE

I
1

-YS.-

l•:ll\\'ARD \\'ILSON A:\IMERl\IAN
BY His 0 uardian ad Litem,
L~ Yerne Bruce Ammerman, and
L.\ VEHXE BRUCE

))

Case
No.10028

.\\I \llj~ H :\L\ ~'

Defendants and Appellants.

1

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENTS
STATEniENT OF CASE
This action is, as outlined in Appellants' statement
of ca~e, one which was brought to recover damages for
personal injuries received in an automobile accident
which occurred on l\Iarch 21, 1962, at the intersection
of ~eeond \Yest and 200 North Street in Salt Lake City,
l~tah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
"~ e

agree as to the disposition in the lower court
as outlined in ..:\. ppellants' statement as to the disposition.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief sought by plaintiffs and respondents on
this appeal is for an Order affirming the judgment of the
jury verdict and for an order affirming the lower court's
denial of appellants' Motion for a New Trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with appellants' Statement of Facts as far as they are presented.
There are additional facts, however, which respondent feels should be brought to the attention of the court,
and we wish to point out the testimony upon which the
jury apparently and justly based their verdict.
Eddie Soliz testified throughout the trial that the
problems, pain, and disability which he suffered and experienced following the accident were not present nor was
he cognizant of them before the accident. (T 147- L 10)
In fact, the entire testimony except an isolated incident
of a pain in his back two years before the accident was
to the effect that his problems of pain and suffering
arose following the accident March 21, 1962. This is not
only borne out by the testimony of l\Ir. Soliz, but is causally connected to the accident according to the testimony and in the opinion of his neurosurgeon, D. C.
Bernson. (T 41 L 16) Mr. Soliz tesetified that following
the accident and over the next month or so his back,
neck, arms, and hands would ache and that he .could
hardly move them until he moved around for a while.
(T 147-L 4) (T 149-L 11); that he was required to

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wear a plastie neck collar (T 149 - L 23) (Also Exhibit p;)) which he was required to wear for from six
to .. ight weeks (T 150- L 18); that during a discogram
opem t ion and examination, he was in terrific pain, thought
he wn~ paralyzPd, was numb (T 152 - L 20); that following the disco gram he was ''pretty sore, lost his voice''
(T 1:-)~ - L 28) ; that his condition failed to improve as
of the date of the trial (T 153 - L 14); that he was by
n•aHon of his injuries unable to report regularly to his
employment (T 1;)3 - L 19) having lost 172 hours of
time from work.
In addition to the pain and suffering experienced
hy ~~ r. Soliz, as mentioned above, the uncontroverted
tl'~timony of l\Ir. Soliz as to the disability he experienced
from the date of the accident to the time of the trial
wa~ that he was unable to walk as he did before the accidPnt (rr 188- L 4), was unable to sit for any period of
time without becoming restless requiring him to get up
and moYe around ( T 188 - L 15), was unable to drive
his ear for any long distances as he did prior to the accident (T 188- L 23), was nervous following the accident
and which he was not before (T 189- L 4), he did not
have the energy he had prior to the accident (T 189 L 10), his sleeping habits were different in that since the
accident he was unable to sleep through the night and
usually had to sleep by himself rather than waking up
other members of his family by reason of his restlessness,
he was unable to go to danees as he did before the accident (T 190- L 2), was unable to go camping, including
fishing and hunting, as he did prior to the accident

3
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(T 190- L 10), was unable to go on a planned vacation
during the summer following the accident ( T 192 - L 9),
was unable to do the normal yard work around his home
which he did prior to the accident ( T 193 - L 17), and
one of the most important items of damages in our opinion is that following the accident :Mr. Soliz was unable
to engage in the normal parental activities with his
children, the normal association which a father enjoys
particularly with sons of the age of the Soliz boys ( T 192
- L 25) in that he was unable to play ball with them, go
on canyon trips, take them to the gym, etc.
Before plaintiff rested his case the court permitted
plaintiff to recall Dr. D. C. Bernson, who had previously
testified. We would like to point out that the substance
of the evidence at the doctor's second appearance was
merely the introduction of the X-rays (Exhibits P10
through P15) (T 210 - L 14) and the polaroid exposures (Exhibits 16 and 17) and his comparison of them
with the X-ray (Exhibit D7) taken by Dr. Reed S. Clegg,
defendants' witness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT LIMITING DR. BERNSON'S TESTIMONY GIVEN
UPON HIS SECOND APPEARANCE IN THE
TRIAL TO THAT WHICH l\IIGHT BE CO~
SIDERED A REBUTTAL OF ~IATTERS TESTIFIED TO BY DEFENDANT'S DOCTOR.
We agree with appellant in his statement of the broad
general rule respecting the order of proof, however, this
4
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holds true only so far as is practicable and subject to
great f!Pxihility and the order of the evidence is neces~mrily g-o\·PnlPd by the trial judge. We believe it to be
hnsie und t lw eaHCH and textbooks abound with the rule
that oiH' of the basic functions of the trial judge is to
n'g-nlah.' the course of the trial and how such is conducted
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is
also hasie that before an appellate court can disturb a
verdiet on this ground it must be clearly shown that
~ut'h diserdion was abused or arbitrary. In re LeFrank's
/-:state, :21-t- Pac. 2d 420; Hanks v. Christensen, ll Utah 2d
~;State v. Bucharrl, 59 P. 468.
\rhih, it is true the trial judge determines whieh
party iH entitled or required to open the evidence it is
not g·pnerally essential that the facts be introduced in
any gin'n order. While the court may exercise discretion
in thiH matter, as a general rule it will not interfere to
control a party as to the order in which he shall introduce hiH c·Yidence but will allow him to do so in the order
in which he prefers. 53 Am. Jr. 102. Thus, we see that
not only is it discretionary with the court but generally
discretionary with a party as to the order of presenting
his eddence.
The purpose of a trial is to obtain justice between
the parties and in so doing we believe it not only proper,
but an incumbent duty on the part of the trial judge to
afford all parties an opportunity to be fully heard. To
have refused plaintiff the opportunity to recall Dr.
Bernson would have been a manifest injustice and is gov5
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erned by the sound discretion of the court. The rule whirh
the courts have adopted is as stated in Vol. 6, P. 4950,
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, and speaking of order
and procedure:
''Nevertheless the rules as to order of proof both
with regard to the order of interrogating a particular witness and with the regard to the order
of calling and interrogating witnesses generally
are not strict. The difficulties and exigencies of
getting competent proof of contested issues before the tribunal are such that hard and fast rules
in this regard would result in the gravest injustice. As one Court observes, ''all the competent
and relevant testimony in a cause ought to be
presented to the jury, and the order of its presentation is often a secondary matter so justice is
done."

Ca,rter v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., South
Carolina, 104 S.E. 186.
and at page 4956 :
"It is also within the discretion of the trial court
to allow rebuttal evidence to be introduced, out of
its order, in the examination in rhief although
such evidence is anticipatory of the case to be
presented by the other side.''

Neilson v. Mike Brown Stone Company, Utah, 69
Pac. 289.
and at page 4963:
"In consonance with the broad discretion of the
trial court as to the order in which evidence shall
be presented and as to permitting the reopening
of a case for the introduction of further evi-

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dPnce aftt•r the <'asp has been c.Iosed it is well
t>stablished that it is within the discretion of the
trial court as to whether a witness may be recalled
and again examined subsequently to his first examination. Recall of a witness is frequently made
neces~;ary by facts arising from the cross-examina t.ion of other witnesses or by reason of inadvertan('e or from other causes and is usually allowed,
in the sound discretion of the court although other
pr<H'Pl'(lings have intervened. While discretion
is sometimes too indulgently exercised in allowing snrh recall, appellate courts do not interfere
whether the request is allowed or refused unless
discretion is c.Iearly abused.''
stating further at page 4966:
... It is then said ·with reference to rulings on the
admission of testimony: "It is firmly settled that
the order of proof is committed to the discretion
of the trial court, and it is seldom, if ever, that
reversible error ran be predicted on this exercise
of such discretion.''

Tlw same rule is stated in Vol. 98 P. 104 of Corpus
Juris Secundum:
"The matter of recalling witnesses ordinarily
rests within the discretion of the trial court, Podol
Y. Jacobs, 173 P. 2d, 75 E (Ariz.) Kelly v. People,
~15 P. 2d 336 (Colo.) and under the facts and circumstances of particular cases, such discretion
has been held not to be abused by permitting or
refusing to permit the recall of witnesses:
''The rules that the recall of a witness rests in the
discretion of the trial court has been applied
where it is sought to recall a witness in order to
pepare a bill of exceptions, to explain or correct
his prior testimony, to settle the testimony given

7
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by the witness when previously testifying, to examine him as to new matter, or for the purpose
of impeaching the witness.
''The trial court may in its discretion permit a
witness to be recalled after the case has been
closed." People v. Reilly, 59 N.E. 1128 (N. Y.)
Killer v. Alexander, 58 S.W. 637 (Tex.).
The same rule is stated in Vol. 4 at Page 3936 in
Nichols Applied Evidence:
"It is within the discretion of the trial court to
permit or refuse recalling of a witness previously
examined either for further direct examination or
for further cross-examination." State v. Rodreguiz, 167 Pac. 426.
and at page 3937:
"It is discretionary to permit or refuse recalling
of witnesses to elicit a repetition of his former
testimony.'' People v. MeN amara, 29 Pac. 953.
In permitting the recalling of Dr. D. C. Bernson by
the plaintiff in order for him to introduce X-rays which
he had taken and to explain them to the jury the trial
judge was acting within the discretion resting with him
to regulate the course and conduct of trials and especially
those which are being heard by a jury. In permitting the
plaintiff to proceed as he did in this matter the trial
judge was attempting to have the trial proceed in the
most orderly and efficient manner as possible so that the
jury would be more likely to understand the facts of the
case and be able to render a just and adequate verdict.
If there was any error on the part of the trial judge in
8
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pt>t'lllittiilg the recalling of Dr. Bernson, such error was

pn•judicial to the defendant in any way and would not
ht> grounds for reversal.
not

Xo error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling
or order or in anything done or omitted by the
court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. U.R.C.P., Rule 61.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW X-RAYS RECEIVED AS
E~XHIBITS IN THE CASE TO BE TAKEN TO
THE JURY ROOM.
Exhibits D7 -D9, inclusive, and exhibits P10-P15,
inclusiYe, are negative exposures of X-ray photographs
taken of the spinal column of plaintiff, Eddie Soliz. The
first mentioned exhibits are side views of the cervical,
thoracic and lumbar spine. (T 280) PlO is a lateral
projection or Yiew of the dorsal-lumbar spine (T 335)
and Pll-P13 are lateral projections of the cervical
spine. (T 336) P14 and P15 are lateral projections,
anterior-posterior (front to back), of the cervical spine
at the time a dye was injected into the cervical discs for
the purpose of obtaining a discogram (T 336) and P16
and P17. which were taken within moments of P14 and
9
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P-15, are positive polaroid exposures which are essentially identical to the X-ray negatives P14 and P15.
The positive exposures are black and white photographs
of the type one is acquainted with in taking snapshots
with a polaroid camera.
At the time the case was submitted to the jury, the
trial judge did not permit the X-ray negatives exhibits
D7 -D9 and P10-P15 to be taken by the jury to be considered in its deliberation in the jury room. However,
the jury was permitted to take with it P16-P17, the
positive exposures of plaintiff's cervical spine.
When counsel for defendant took exception to the
court's refusal to permit all the X-rays to he taken by the
jury to the jury room for its deliberation, the court responded as follows:
By way of clarification on that matter, the Court
might state for the record, it's this court's understanding that P16 and P17 were not photographs
of the corresponding numbered X-rays, but were
independent photographs taken on polaroid film
which were taken independently of the X-rays of
the same area and were then a matter of seconds
and at most minutes apart from same. And it ap ..
peared to the court that these polaroid positive
photographs could at least to an extent be interpreted hy lay persons, to-wit: the jury; whereas
X-rays themselves with or without a viewbox
are almost impossible of intelligible interpretation
by lay people, to-wit: a jury. (T239)
Defendant insists that the trial court's refusal to permit
all of the X-rays to go to the jury room was error. Plain·
tiff disagrees.
10
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It is hornbook law that to regulate the course of busincs!-l during the progress of a trial is within the sound dis<'l'<'tion of the trial judge and there will not be a verbal
rapping of his judicial knuckles by an appellate court
unless thPrl' has lwen an abuse of that discretion. 53 .Am.
Jur .. Trial § 34. Indeed, the trial judge must be recognized as the auhority in charge of the trial and he should
he allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the mechanics of procedure, and his rulings thereon will not be
diRturlwd unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and to the prejudice of the objecting party.
llanks Y. Ch risfeHscn, 11 U. 2d 8, 354 P. 2d 564; State v.
Buchard, 35 Or. 484, 59 P. 468; St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. eo. ,.. Mitchell, 115 Ark. 339, 171 S.W. 895; Zinn v.
l•,'.r-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 306 P. 2d 1017.
The Utah Statute relating to papers and exhibits
taken hy the jury for deliberation in the jury room is contained in Rule 47 (m) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
is as follows :
Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take
with them the instructions of the court and all
exhibits and all papers which have been received
as evidence in the cause, except depositions or
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion
of the court, to be taken from the person having
them in possession; and they may also take with
them notes of the testimony or other proceedings
on the trial taken by themselves or any of them,
but none taken by any other person.

It should be noted that the Utah Statute indicates that
the jury may (emphasis added) take papers to the jury
11
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room, and that certain papers rnay be withheld from the
jury that the judge, in his opinion, thinks ought not be
taken from the person having custody and possession of
same. By its terms the Utah Rule is permissive and
not mandatory so that the trial judge is not required
to send exhibits to the jury room but may do so, if in the
exercise of his discretion, he thinks that the ends of justice will be attained by so doing.
At Common Law, jurors were not permitted to take
with them any unsealed papers introduced in evidence
except with the consent of the parties, but the reasons
for the rule have now disappeared and under the modern
practice, it is the general rule in most jurisdictions,
both in the absence of and also under statute, that when
the jury retires to deliberate on their verdict, they may
in the court's discretion take with them such books and
papers as have been introduced in evidence. See 53
Am. Jur., Trial, § 921 and 924 and the cases there cited.
The court's action either in sending or refusing to
send documents to the jury room will not be interfered
with on appeal except in case of abuse. Sibley v. 1lfason,
196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887; Sandel r. Stale, 115 S.C.
168, 104 S.E. 567, 13 ALR 1268; overruled on another
point in Sirrene v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 253, 128 S.E. 172.
Insofar as the matter may be said in any manner to
be governed by statute, it has been held that X-ray photographs constitute ''papers in evidence'' or ''written
evidence'' within the meaning of statutes allowing such
12
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t>Vidl'IH'l'

to be taken by the jury into the jury room when

they retire to delilwrate the verdict.
ehi(~ago &

J. Electric R. Co. v. Spence, 213 Ill. 220,

i~ ~.E.

796; Texas Employees bzs. Ass. v. Crow, 148
TPx. 113, ~:n 8.\V. 2d 235, 10 ALR 2d 913 .
. \s the problem presented in Point II relates to X-ray

photographs, plaintiff has been unable to find any case
dealing with the point under discussion, i. e., there are no
causes dealing with the trial judge's refusal to permit
X-rays to go to the jury room. There are, however, several cases that discuss the propriety of the trial judge
permitting X-ray exhibits to be taken by the jury during
its deliberation. All cases that have discussed the problem hold that the trial judge does not err if he permits
the X-ray exhibits to be taken by the jury. See the
annotation in 10 ALR 2d 918.
However, there are no cases that hold that the trial
judge m nsf permit such exhibits to be taken by the jury
in order to prevent error.
One case dealing with X-ray exhibits in the passession of the jury, while different on its facts and presenting a different problem, is of assistance in disposing
of this case. In the case of Hasty Messenger Service v.
Simpson (Okla.), 363 P. 2d 370, the jury obtained possession of certain X-rays which were not properly admitted into eYidence. The improper X-rays were photographs of the plaintiff's injuries. There were other
X-ray photographs tending to identify plaintiff's injuries which were properly introduced into evidence and
13
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the jury took with it into the jury room both the improper
X-rays and the competent X-ray exhibits. Defendant
appealed from an adverse judgment assigning as error
the possession and consideration by the jury of incompetent X-ray photographs. On appeal the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma held that the jury's possession of X-rays not
properly admitted into evidence provided no grounds for
reversal where the jury had other competent X-ray e,·idence tending to identify the injury complained of and
showing the connection between plaintiff and the injuries
shown where defendant's medical witness complained
mainly of the positioning of the head in the excluded
X-rays and also differed to some degree as to the interpretations of the excluded X-rays.
On the basis of Rule 47 (m) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule of law in most American jurisdictions, and the facts of the case on appeal herein it is
plaintiff's contention that the trial court did not err in
refusing to permit all the X-ray exhibits to be taken by
the jury into the jury room. Certainly, to insist that the
trial judge must do so or be in error in light of the permissive terminology of the Utah Rule and the law generally is an attempt to negate the action of the lawyers
and jurists who authored the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to overthrow the rule of law establishrd in
well reasoned cases in the majority of American jurisdictions. Certainly, the jurors in the instant case were
permitted to take the positive photographs of plaintiff's
cervical spine ·with them into the jury room and in the
exercise of his sound discretion, the trial judge ·was of
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the opinion that a just result would more likely be reached
hy the procedure followed than to permit all X-rays,
negative and positive, to go to the jury room. Defendant
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the trial
court 'H action in this matter, for no such abuse occurred.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
\Yhen taking exceptions to the trial court's instructions to the jury, defendant took exception to the Court's
failure to give all of defendant's requested instructions
in the form and manner requested. Of the instructions
that the Court did give, defendant took exception to a
part of Instruction No 8 ( T 240). Instruction No. 8 in
its entirety reads as follows:
'' .:\ motorist who has the right of way need not
anticipate sudden outbreaks of negligence on the
part of other drivers. In fact, the failure to observe the happening of the negligent acts would
be a proximate cause of the collision only when
by observing, the motorist who had the right
of way could have avoided the resulting collision.
It is the duty of drivers entering an intersection
to continue to observe the intersection and approaching vehicles throughout the time that they
are entering and crossing the intersection. They
should reappraise the relative positions of their
automobile and any approaching automobiles and
should proceed with reasonable care in view of
such continuing re-appraisals and the information
gained regarding speeds, distances, and relative
positions of the automobile.''
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In objecting to the giving of said instruction counsel for defendant stated (T 240, Lines 19-25) :
''As to the Court's instructions which were ginm,
I'll take exception to Instruction No. 8 specifically
that part of No.8 which says "that a motorist who
has the right of way need not anticipate sudden
outbreaks of negligence on the part of other
drivers'' in that the instruction seems to comment on the evidence; seems to assume there was
a sudden outbreak of negligence on the part of the
defendant, and in that respect prejudices the
jury."
From the transcript it is apparent that defendant
objected only to the first sentence of Instruction No. 8
which is to the effect that a motorist who has the right
of way need not anticipate sudden outbreaks of negligence on the part of other drivers. Defendant assumes
that when the Instruction was given the trial judge was
telling the jury and the jury understood, that plaintiff
had the right of way and defendant was guilty of a sudden outbreak of negligence when, in fact, a reading of
a part of the instruction or a reading of the \Yhole .of it
reveals that no such assumption is warranted. This is
especially true when one realies that contributory negligence of plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, was submitted to the
jury for this determination.
Of importance in solving this problem is consideration of two other Instructions which were given by thr
trial judge. They are as follows :
"Instruction No. 26: If during the trial the court
has said or done anything which has suggested to
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Yon that it is indinc>d to favor the claims or position of either party, you will not suffer yourselves
to he influenced by any such suggesetion.

The court has not intended to express, nor to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are, or
are not, worthy of belief; what facts are, or are
not, established; nor what inferences should be
drawn from the evidence; nor which party should
prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate
an opinion relating to any of these matters, you
should disregard it, because you are the exclusive
judges of the facts.''
''Instruction No. 28: If in these instructions any
rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying
ways, no emphasis thereon is intended and none
must be inferred by you. For that reason you
are not to single out any certain sentence or any
individual point or instruction and ignore the
others, but you are to consider all the instructions
as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all
the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has
no significance as to their relative importance.''
By means of Instruction No. 26 the trial court properly told the jury that in all the things he said during the
course of the trial he had not intended to comment on the
credibility of witnesses or the weight of proof of facts
and if it appeared to the jurors that this is what he had
done it was unintentional and they were not to be influenced thereby and were to disregard it.

In Instruction X o. 28 the jurors were advised that
no emphasis on any facts of the trial was intended by
the Instructions and that the jury was not to consider
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or single out any particular Instruction and ignore others, but it was to consider all the Instructions as a whole
and in the light of all the others.
After having instructed the jury and admonished
it about the duty of the jury and about the law and especially after having admonished the jurors and instructing them to the contrary as it did in Instruction No. 26
and No. 28, defendant argues that "The jury rnight
(emphasis added) assume from that that the Court felt
there was a sudden outbreak of negligence on the part
of the defendant." (T. 240, Lines 26-28) The basis of
the argument which infers that the jury did so assume
because they might have done so is so tenons that one
is disposed to think that defendant, with tongue in
cheek, assigned Point III of his brief as error. An Appellate Court will not go on a "scavenger hunt" seeking
reasons to reverse a trial court and the reviewing court
will not reverse the lower court unless substantial
grounds exist therefore, and such grounds are specifically called to the attention of the Appellate Court.
The instruction complained of by defendant correctly
states the law in this and the majority of American
jurisdictions. Not only need not the driver of an automobile possessing the right of way over other vehicular
traffic expect or assume sudden outbursts of negligence
on the part of the operators of the other vehicles, but any
person who is observing due care for his own safety has
the right to assume that the operators of other vehicles
are possessed of normal faculties of sight and hearing
and that they will use them in exercising ordinary' care
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for their own safety and the safety of others; and he
ha:-; the right to rely on that assumption unless, in the
l'XPrl'i~w of due care, he observes or should observe something to warn him to the contrary. Bryant v. Bingham
Stage Ijinc, 60 Utah 299, 208 P 541; JIFU 16:10; BAJI
:20:!-B .

•\g-ain, a person who is exercising due care has a

right to assume that others will also perform their duties under the law, and he has a right to rely and act on
that assumption unless, in the exercise of due care, he
observes or should observe something to warn him to
the contrary. In the absence of any such warning, it is
not negligent for a person to fail to anticipate injury
which can come to him only from a violation of law or
duty by another. Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176
P. :367, JIFU 16:12 BAJI 138.
Furthermore, it would make no difference whether
the act of negligence complained of was a sudden outburst or a normal, regular act, timewise, so long as it
proximiately caused the injury complained of. Instruction Xo. 8, then, applies to any and all drivers of motor
vehicles and not to defendant only as argued. The law
as embodied in the instruction was also applicable to
plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, and it being couched in terms
sufficiently general there can be no doubt that was what
the trial court intended and that the jury so understood it.
Upon completion of the trial, in the chambers of the
trial judge, and prior to the instruction of the jury, plain19
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tiff's attorney made two motions, together and in the
alternative (T 233). The first motion was that the court
direct a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs and against
defendant Ammerman on the ground that defendant was
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause
of the accident. The second motion, in the alternative,
was that the court find as a matter of law that defendant
Ammerman was negligent as a matter of law and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
In response to palintiffs' motions counsel for defendant stated (T. 234) :
''I would consent to the granting of the alternative motion, that the Court might find as a matter of law that the defendant was guilty of negligence in making a left hand turn (emphasis
added) and leave the issue of contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Soliz to the jury."
Prior to the time that the jury was instructed in this
matter counsel for defendant consented to a finding that
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in
making a left-hand turn, and after the jury was instructed, attorney for defendant objected to a part of Instruction No. 8 on the ground that the jury might assume (1) that plaintiff had the right of way, and (2) that
defendant was guilty of a sudden outbreak of negligence.
It seems apparent to plaintiffs that defendant, having
consented to the finding of negligence against himself in
making a left-hand turn, the instruction was not improper
and in any event was not prejudicial to defendant. For if
defendant was guilty of negligence in making a left-hand
20
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turn it follows that he failed to yield the right of way
to plaintiff, and defendant being negligent in making the
left-hand turn it is immaterial whether the negligent act
was a sudden outbreak or any other negligent act.
Based upon the argument presented herein and the
law cited in support thereof, plaintiff urges upon the
rourt that Instruction No 8 given by the court was not
an erroneous or improper statement of the law, and that
in any event, it was not prejudicial to defendant.

POINT IV
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS NOT EXCESSIVE AND WAS NOT GIVEN UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
We believe it to be patently basic that the peculiar
province of the jury is the determination of questions
of fact arising in the trial of the action in which it sits
and that it exercises its province upon the evidence
introduced.
We believe further that one who has a grievance
seeks legal redress, presents his case to a court or jury
and receives a verdict after a fair trial that all presumption revolve in the favor of the validity of all matters
determined. Joseph v. L. D. S. Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94,
348 Pac. 2d 935.
In the instant case the jury determined the plaintiff
was entitled to and returned a verdict of $15,000.00.

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As stated many times by this court, there is no fixed rule
by which to measure the amount of damages to be award~
ed for pain and suffering and the matter is properly left
to the sound discretion of the jury. Further, that in
assessing damages the jury can consider loss of wages,
permanent disability, loss of bodily function disfigurement, and prolonged pain and suffering. This in substance is what the court instructed (Instr. 16) and we
must conclude, by reason of the presumption in the prevailing parties' favor, what the jury considered in arriving at its verdict. The evidence is substantial to justify
the finding of the amount in that the plaintiff has
substantial amount of trouble in walking, sitting,
driving, sleeping, dancing, camping, fishing, hunting,
playing with his children, working in his yard, is
nervous and has no energy. The jury might also have
considered in addition to the actual time lost from the
plaintiff's job his probable loss of income by reason of
his inability to do the requirements of his job. Though
his Civil Service rating had not decreased he was unable,
by reason of his injuries, to do his job and was working
at a job with a rating of one less.
In addition to the above mentioned items which the
jury could consider in assessing the plaintiffs' damages
undoubtedly the jury also considered the testimony of
Dr Bernson wherein he testified· that sooner or later an
operation would become necessary to remove the ruptured or herniated discs ( T 45 - L 9). Such an operation to cost between $800.00 to $1,050.00 (T 46 and 27).
The normal recovery period being about eighteen months
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(T 47- L ~7) and leaving a residual permanent partial
disability of from nine per cent to eleven per cent total
bodily disfunction (T 48-L 12).
Taking into consideration all of the evidence and
tPstimony concerning damages we feel only one conelusion could be reached that being that the jury, in
accordance with the Instructions, awarded a fair and
just verdict and duly considered " ... the nature and
l'XtC'nt of the injuries, the degree and character of the
suffering ... its probable duration and severity ... prevented from the ordinary affairs of life ... loss of earnings or earning capacity which results from the injuries''
(Inst. 16)
The law is well stated in the case of Paul v. J(irkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P. 2d 670, and which we believe summarizes the major Utah cases concerning this point. The
court states :
"It is not enough, under this rule nor under the
code provision which it supplanted, merely to allege that the amount itself is excessive. The
amount of the verdict is ordinarily a matter exrlush·e ly for the jury and on the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not
interfere with the jury's verdict unless is clearly
appears that the award was rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice.''

''There can be no fixed rule to measure the amount
of damages to be awarded for pain suffered; the
matter is properly left to the sound discretion cf
an unprejudiced jury, Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44
rtah 88, 138 P. 1172, and the jury is allowed great
latitude in assessing damages for personal injur23
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ies. Duffy v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., Utah, 218 P.
2d 1080. The elements which the jury could properly consider in arriving at a figure '''hich, of
course, can only approximate compensation to thC'
plaintiff, are loss of wages, permanent disahil it~·.
loss of bodily function, disfigurement and prolonged pain and suffering. Duffy v. Union Par.
R. R. Co., supra.''
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the facts as revealed in the record
in this matter and the law as discussed herein, the negligence of the defendant cannot be questioned and the severity of the injuries to the plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, amply
demonstrated, so that the verdict rendered in this matter by the jury was reasonable and just.
The action of the trial judge in permitting the plaintiff to call witnesses in the order that it did and in permitting certain exhibits to he taken to the jury room
and refusing others to be taken are well within the discretion granted to the judge and his prerogative to determine the course and conduct of the trial. Therefore,
the jury verdict should remain undisturbed and the
Order of the trial judge in denying defendant's Motion
for New Trial affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
CARMAN E. KrPP, Esq ..
TEL CHARLIER, Esq.
Attorneys for Plai11tiffs
and Respondents
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